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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
good cause shown, even after proof of due publication of his intention is
made. State ex rel. Ramsey v. Green (Mo. App. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d) 629.
At common law the general rule was that the probate court had no
power, in the absence of statutory authorization, to accept the resignation
of an administrator once duly appointed and qualified. Flinn v. Chase
(N. Y. 1847) 4 Denio 85. But even at common law there were cases which
held that though there might be no statute allowing an administrator to
resign, yet the acceptance of his resignation by the probate court amounts
to a revocation of his authority. Marsh v. The People (1853) 15 Ill. 284;
Trumble v. Williams (1885) 18 Neb. 144; Tulburt v. Hollar (1889) 102
N. C. 406. See also 2 Woerner, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION
(3rd ed. 1923) 886. Such cases lend further plausibility to the views of the
principal case and apparently minimize the importance of statutory
authorization of the procedure permitted in that case. H. H. G., '33.
JUVENILE COURTS-CONSTITUTIONALITY-DENIAL OF RIGHT OF APPEAL.-
Petitioner, a minor under 18 years of age, was committed to the Iowa
Industrial School for Boys, after a hearing before a district judge without
a jury, in accordance with provisions of Iowa Code (1927) cs. 179-180, secs.
3605-3657. It was contended that the statute which provided for no appeal,
constituted a denial of due process of law. The contention was rejected.
Wissenburg v. Bradley (1929) 209 Iowa 813, 227 N. W. 136. Rehearing
denied, judgment modified (Iowa 1929) 229 N. W. 205.
The right of appeal was unknown at common law, being purely a creature
of statute. State v. Olsen (1917) 180 Iowa 97, 162 N. W. 781; Davidson v.
Commonwealth (1917) 174 Ky. 789, 192 S. W. 846; State v. Thayer (1900)
158 Mo. 36, 58 S. W. 12. It is not a constitutional right and is wholly with-
in the power of the legislature to grant or deny, in either civil or criminal
cases. Applebaum v. U. S. (C. C. A. 7, 1921) 274 F. 43; Marlow v. Com-
monwealth (1911) 142 Ky. 106, 133 S. W. 1137; Andrews v. Swartz (1895)
156 U. S. 272; McKane v. Dwiston (1894) 153 U. S. 684.
In Ex parte Januszewski (D. C. S. D. Ohio 1911) 196 F. 123, the peti-
tioner, a boy 14 years of age, alleged that he was unlawfully imprisoned in
the Boys' Industrial School and asked to be discharged on a writ of habeas
corpus. It was held the federal court could not adjudge the Juvenile Act
[Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1926) secs. 1639-1683], regulating the control of de-
linquent children, invalid because it contained no provision for appeal. The
quasi-criminal nature of juvenile court proceedings has been outweighed, in
this connection, by the fact that the judgment is not one of imprisonment, but
merely a provision of the government, standing in loco parentis, for the
protection, correction, and care of the child. Marlow v. Commonwealth,
supra. It is not necessary for the right of appeal to be granted to juvenile
delinquents, even though it is granted to criminals. The state in its ca-
pacity of parens patriae may, without violation of the guaranty of due proc-
ess of law, restrain delinquent, incorrigible, and homeless children of their
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liberty. State v. Parsons (1913) 153 Wis. 20, 139 N. W. 825; State v.
Tineher (1914) 258 Mo. 1, 166 S. W. 1028.
Another objection that has been raised in analogous cases is that an act
such as the juvenile court act, by conferring upon a special court the
power to deal with a certain class of cases, limits and impairs the juris-
diction given to the courts of general jurisdiction by the state constitution;
but this question has been decided in the negative. De May v. Liberty
Foundry Co. (Mo. 1931) 37 S. W. (2d) 640. H. H. G., '33.
REAL PROPERTY-DowER RIGHTS-NECESSITY OF JOINDER OF HUSBAND IN A
DEED OF CONVEYANCE.-In an action of ejectment brought by the grantee
of the deceased wife of defendant, the defense was that under the statute
abolishing tenancy by the curtesy and granting in lieu thereof a right in
the widower to the same share in the deceased wife's real estate as the law
provides for the widow in the real estate of her deceased husband, it was
necessary for the husband to join in his wife's deed of conveyance. Held,
that such statutory provision does not change the prior interpretation of
the Married Woman's Act, R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 2998 and 3003, to the
effect that the husband need not join in the deed of conveyance where the
wife conveys property owned in her own right. Scott v. Scott et al. (1930)
324 Mo. 1055, 26 S. W. (2d) 598.
Prior to 1889, Missouri followed the common-law rule that a husband's
right of curtesy would not be prejudiced by a deed of conveyance of the real
estate owned by the wife in her own right in the event that the husband
were not joined in the deed. Clay v. Mayr (1898) 144 Mo. 376, 46 S. W.
157; Kennedy v. Koopman (1901) 166 Mo. 87, 65 S. W. 1020. In 1889 the
Missouri Legislature enacted the Married Woman's Act, noted above, which
provided that "a married woman shall be deemed a femme sole so far as
to enable her to carry on and transact business on her own account, to con-
tract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, and to enforce and have
enforced against her property such judgment as may be rendered for or
against her, and may sue. and be sued at law or in equity, with or without
her husband being joined as a party." Whether a wife, owning property in
her own right might, without joining her husband, convey title unineum-
bered by curtesy right first arose in Brook v. Barker (1921) 287 Mo. 13,
228 S. W. 805, where the court held the husband's joinder unnecessary. The
ruling was based chiefly upon a prior decision rendered in Bank v. Hageluken
(1901) 165 Mo. 443, 65 S. W. 728, and upon subsequent decisions which
cited the Hageluken case with approval, such as Riggs v. Price (1919) 277
Mo. 333, 210 S. W. 420; Kirkpatrick v. Pease (1907) 202 Mo. 471, 101
S. W. 651; First National Bank v. Kirby (1916) 269 Mo. 285, 190 S. W.
597. The court in the Hageluken case, above, states the view of the Mis-
souri courts with reference to the statute, that its effect is to confer on a
married woman the legal estate in her land in as full and complete manner
and degree as if she were a femme sole.
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